CONCORD, SCC Announce Secure Container Regulation, Firmware Upgrades

In an effort to prevent litter, navigational hazards, and “unfair and unreasonable monopolization of mineral resources in high security systems,” CONCORD and SCC have announced new regulations designed to prevent these occurrences. Speaking from the CONCORD Logistic Support station at Yulai VIII, Moon 10, Tuonainen Katagas of CONCORD’s public relations division said, “After numerous complaints from an array of sources, we have reviewed the situation and determined it needed correction.”

Katagas said that CONCORD and the SCC began collecting data on this subject some time ago, and after careful study determined there was enough “adverse impact on the lives and work of normal citizens” to justify a change in the secure container on-board firmware.

The initial changes will disable activation of onboard rotation control units that will prevent the secure containers from long-term deployment in systems with a CONCORD security rating of 0.8 or better. Subsequent changes, which will be broadcast to all existing Secure Container units from CONCORD/SCC transmission devices in all standard stargates, will de-activate any operational rotation control units in highly secure systems, which will destabilize any secure containers currently deployed, resulting in their eventual destruction.

The rotation control units, when active, control heating and cooling across the outer skin of the secure container by controlling dark side-light side exposure, ensuring uniform internal temperatures that stabilize the container and prevent radical dimorphic temperature differentials which, unchecked, cause the eventual rupture and implosion of the container. The RCUs also act to stabilize the container’s position in local space by minimizing drift through a series of periodic orientation checks and adjustments against relative position to any single or combination of stargates, which broadcast standard navigational signals at regular intervals.

“We are making this announcement as public as possible in an effort to allow individuals and organizations ample time to retrieve any containers currently deployed in highly secure space. After this firmware change is finalized and transmitted, any deployed containers will become unstable and suffer damage or destruction.”

All newly constructed secure containers will receive the firmware revision, and non-deployed cans will receive the revision when performing orientation checks subsequent to being launched into space but prior to being deployed. They will then transmit failure codes to their launching craft, allowing pilots unaware of the CONCORD/SCC change the opportunity to recover their containers before they are damaged.

When asked if this change was in response to increased complaints of “resource denial,” or attempts at resource monopolization in national space by miners of international origin, Katagas demurred to comment directly. “We have heard complaints from pilots of various nationalities that members of their historic adversaries have been engaging in ‘predatory mining,’ but we have been unable to conclusively prove or disprove those allegations. Regardless, these changes should address that sort of problem.”

“We are confident,” Katagas said at the conclusion of the press conference, “that these changes will eliminate pollution in our space lanes and afford entrepreneurs the opportunity to make a living in harvesting the natural resources available to them without having to compete with well-established individuals or organizations rapidly exhausting local resources.”